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a b s t r a c t 
Cross-site scripting and injection vulnerabilities are among the most common and serious security issues 
for Web applications. Although existing static analysis approaches can detect potential vulnerabilities in 
source code, they generate many false warnings and source-sink traces with irrelevant information, mak- 
ing their adoption impractical for security auditing. 
One suitable approach to support security auditing is to compute a program slice for each sink, which 
contains all the information required for security auditing. However, such slices are likely to contain a 
large amount of information that is irrelevant to security, thus raising scalability issues for security audits. 
In this paper, we propose an approach to assist security auditors by deﬁning and experimenting with 
pruning techniques to reduce original program slices to what we refer to as security slices , which contain 
sound and precise information. 
To evaluate the proposed approach, we compared our security slices to the slices generated by a state- 
of-the-art program slicing tool, based on a number of open-source benchmarks. On average, our security 
slices are 76% smaller than the original slices. More importantly, with security slicing, one needs to audit 
approximately 1% of the total code to ﬁx all the vulnerabilities, thus suggesting signiﬁcant reduction in 
auditing costs. 
© 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
Vulnerabilities in Web systems pose serious security and pri- 
vacy threats such as privacy data breaches, data integrity vio- 
lations, and denials of service. According to OWASP (2013) , in- 
jection vulnerabilities are the most serious vulnerabilities for 
Web systems. Among injection vulnerabilities, Cross-site scripting 
(XSS), SQL injection (SQLi), XML injection (XMLi), XPath injection 
(XPathi), and LDAP injection (LDAPi) vulnerabilities are the most 
commonly found in Web applications and Web services. These vul- 
nerabilities are usually caused by user inputs in security-sensitive 
program operations ( sinks ), which have no proper sanitization or 
validation mechanism. 
The majority of the approaches that deal with XSS, SQLi, XMLi, 
XPathi, and LDAPi issues are security testing approaches ( Antunes 
and Vieira, 2013; Appelt et al., 2014; Laranjeiro et al., 2014; Thomé
et al., 2014 ), and dynamic analysis approaches that detect attacks 
at runtime based on known attack signatures ( Mainka et al., 2013; 
Rosa et al., 2013; Razzaq et al., 2014 ) or legitimate queries ( Su and 
Wassermann, 2006; Halfond et al., 2008; Shahriar and Zulkernine, 
2012; Tao, 2013 ). However, a security auditor is typically required 
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to locate vulnerabilities in source code, identify their causes and 
ﬁx them. Analysis reports from the above-mentioned approaches, 
though useful, would not be suﬃcient to support code auditing as 
they only contain information derived from observed program be- 
haviors or execution traces. 
Approaches based on taint analysis ( Livshits and Lam, 2005; Jo- 
vanovic et al., 2006; Tripp et al., 2009; Pérez et al., 2011; Tripp 
et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2014 ) and symbolic execution ( Kiezun 
et al., 2009; Zheng and Zhang, 2013 ) help identify and locate po- 
tential vulnerabilities in program code, and thus, could assist the 
auditor’s tasks. However, none of these approaches, except for the 
work reported in Pérez et al. (2011) , seems to explicitly address 
XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi. Hence, adapting these approaches to de- 
tect these types of vulnerabilities is a major need. 
Furthermore, reports from taint analysis-based approaches only 
contain data-ﬂow analysis traces and lack control-dependency in- 
formation , which is essential for security auditing. Indeed, condi- 
tional statements checks are often used to perform input valida- 
tion or sanitization tasks and, without analyzing such conditions, 
feasible and infeasible data-ﬂows cannot be determined, thus caus- 
ing many false warnings. Symbolic execution approaches reason 
with such conditions, but have yet to address scalability issues 
due to the path explosion problem ( Yang et al., 2014 ). Other ap- 
proaches ( Yamaguchi et al., 2014 ) report analysis results without 
any form of pruning (e.g., the whole program dependency graph), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jss.2017.02.040 
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thus containing a signiﬁcant amount of information not useful to 
security auditing. As a result, an auditor might end up checking 
large chunks of code, which is not practical. 
Program slicing ( Weiser, 1981 ) is one suitable technique that 
could help security auditors verify and ﬁx potential vulnerabili- 
ties in source code. Like taint analysis, program slicing is also a 
static analysis technique, but it extracts all the statements that 
satisfy a given criterion, including control-ﬂow and data-ﬂow in- 
formation, whereas taint analysis techniques only consider data- 
dependencies. However, there are also precision issues with slices 
since a large proportion of their statements may not be relevant to 
security auditing. Thus, without dedicated support, security audit- 
ing can be expected to be laborious, error-prone, and not scalable. 
In this paper, our goal is to help security auditors, in a scalable 
way, to audit source code for identifying and ﬁxing deﬁciencies 
in implemented security features. Our approach aims to system- 
atically extract relevant security features implemented in source 
code. More precisely, to facilitate security auditing of XSS, SQLi, 
XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi vulnerabilities in program source code, 
we apply static analysis to ﬁrst identify the input sources (program 
points at which user inputs are accessed), and the sinks. Then, we 
apply program slicing and code ﬁltering techniques to extract min- 
imal and relevant source code that only contains statements re- 
quired for auditing potential vulnerabilities related to each sink, 
pruning away other statements that do not require auditing. 
The speciﬁc contributions of our approach include: 
- Sound and scalable security auditing. We deﬁne a speciﬁc se- 
curity slicing approach for the auditing of security vulnera- 
bilities in program source code. Like taint analysis, our ap- 
proach also uses static program analysis techniques, which 
are known to be scalable ( Tripp et al., 2013 ). However, our 
analysis additionally extracts control-dependency informa- 
tion, which is often important for the security auditing of 
input validation and sanitization procedures. On the other 
hand, it ﬁlters out irrelevant and secure code from the gen- 
erated vulnerability report. This ensures soundness and scal- 
ability. 
- Fully automated tool. A tool called JoanAudit , which fully au- 
tomates our proposed approach, has been implemented for 
Java Web systems based on a program slicing tool called 
Joana ( Hammer, 2009 ). We have published the tool and the 
user manual online ( Thomé, 2015 ) so that our experiments 
can be replicated. 
- Specialized security analysis. JoanAudit is readily conﬁgured for 
XSS, SQLi, XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi vulnerabilities. In com- 
parison, current program slicing tools are not specialized for 
such security needs; furthermore, most of the existing taint 
analysis tools do not readily support XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi 
vulnerabilities. 
- Systematic evaluation. We have evaluated our approach based 
on 43 programs from 9 Java Web systems, and analyzed 154 
sinks from these Web programs. For each of them, a conven- 
tional slice was computed using Joana and a security slice 
was computed using our approach. Compared to the sizes 
of conventional program slices, our security slices are sig- 
niﬁcantly smaller with reductions averaging 76%. Thus, the 
results show that our security slices are signiﬁcantly more 
precise in terms of information relevant to security auditing. 
Based on manual veriﬁcation, we also conﬁrmed that the se- 
curity slices are sound since all the information relevant to 
security auditing is extracted. From a practical standpoint, 
the results also show that by using our approach an auditor 
is required to audit approximately 1% of the total program 
code. 
This paper is an extension of our prior work ( Thomé et al., 
2015 ). The main extensions include: 
- Types of vulnerabilities. We address two more important types 
of vulnerabilities: XSS and LDAPi. XSS is currently the most 
common type of vulnerabilities in Web applications. LDAPi is 
also an important issue to address since LDAP directory ser- 
vices are increasingly used in enterprise Web applications. 
- Context analysis. We provide a lightweight static analysis tech- 
nique that extracts and analyzes path conditions from secu- 
rity slices to identify the context in which user inputs are 
used in a given sink and determine the appropriate sanitiza- 
tion procedures for securing those inputs. This information 
is used to ﬁx some of the vulnerabilities automatically. 
- Experiments. We conduct experiments on four additional Web 
systems to cover a larger variety of application domains, a 
wider system size range and new, additional types of vul- 
nerabilities. 
- Detailed descriptions. We provide detailed descriptions of the 
techniques (information ﬂow control and automated code 
ﬁxing) that we use to support code ﬁltering. We also pro- 
vide a detail description of the JoanAudit tool. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates some 
preliminary concepts; Section 3 gives an overview of the pro- 
posed security slicing approach; Section 4 presents the approach 
in detail; Section 5 discusses our prototype tool; Section 6 re- 
ports on the evaluation results; Section 7 discusses related work; 
Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section, we present some concepts used in the rest 
of the paper. We ﬁrst provide a short overview of the injection 
vulnerabilities we address based on the deﬁnitions provided by 
OWASP (2013) , and introduce the concepts of input sources and 
sinks. We then discuss the program slicing techniques applied in 
our approach. 
2.1. Injection vulnerabilities 
XSS : It is a code injection attack that injects client script code 
into the HTML code generated by the server program through user 
inputs, so that when a client visits the compromised Web page, 
the injected code is executed in the client’s Web browser, pos- 
sibly accessing and transmitting client’s conﬁdential information 
such as cookies. The injection is performed by inserting meta- 
characters or keywords speciﬁc to client-side script interpreters, 
such as < script > and javascript . 
SQL injection : SQLi is an attack technique used to exploit ap- 
plications that dynamically construct SQL queries by using user in- 
puts to access or update relational databases. The attack makes use 
of meta-characters speciﬁc to SQL parsers, such as ’ , # , and % , to 
alter the logic of the query. 
LDAP injection : Similar to SQLi, LDAPi targets applications that 
dynamically build LDAP search ﬁlters using user inputs; the attack 
makes use of meta-characters speciﬁc to the LDAP search ﬁlter lan- 
guage ( Howes, 1997 ), such as ( and & , to alter the logic of the 
query. 
XML injection : XMLi is an integrity violation, where an attacker 
changes the hierarchical structure of an XML document by inject- 
ing XML elements through user inputs. 
XPATH injection : Similar to SQLi and LDAPi, XPathi is an attack 
technique used to exploit applications that construct XPath (XML 
Path Language) queries using user inputs to query or navigate XML 
documents. It can be used directly by an application to query an 
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Fig. 1. Secure servlet with sanitization functions. 
Fig. 2. The user ﬁle users.xml . 
XML document as part of a larger operation, such as applying an 
XSLT transformation to, or executing an XQuery on, an XML docu- 
ment. 
2.2. Input sources and sinks 
Input sources are operations that access external data that can 
be manipulated by malicious users. Speciﬁcally, in our approach, 
we deﬁne as input sources the accesses to: HTTP request parame- 
ters (e.g., getParameter() ), HTTP headers, cookies, session ob- 
jects, external ﬁles, and databases. 
Sinks are operations that are sensitive to XSS, SQLi, XMLi, 
XPathi, or LDAPi. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the following elements as 
sinks: 
• HTML document operations (e.g., javax.servlet.jsp. 
JspWriter.print() ); 
• SQLi queries (e.g., java.sql.Statement.executeQuery 
() ); 
• XML document operations (e.g., org.xml.sax.XMLReader. 
parse() ); 
• XPath queries (e.g., javax.xml.xpath.XPath.evaluate 
() ); 
• LDAPi queries (e.g., com.novell.ldap.LDAPConnection. 
search() ). 
We now illustrate XMLi and XPathi vulnerabilities and the con- 
cepts of input sources and sinks using the example in Fig. 1 , which 
we also use as running example throughout the paper. 
The Java code snippet illustrated in Fig. 1 grants or denies ac- 
cess to a Web application or service and/or creates a new user. The 
Java servlet interface implementation doPost() stores the values 
of three POST parameters ( account , password , and mode ) in 
variables that carry the same names. All the parameters are pro- 
vided by the user of the Web application. If the mode parameter is 
equal to the string login , function allowUser() is called with 
account and password as parameters, to allow the user to ac- 
cess the application; otherwise, a new user account is created by 
invoking function createUser() with account and password 
as parameters. We assume that users credentials are stored in the 
XML document shown in Fig. 2 and named users.xml . 
The accesses to HTTP parameters at lines 2–4 are input sources. 
The XPath query at line 18 and the XML document processing op- 
eration at line 26 are sinks. 
For granting or denying access, function allowUser() 
in Fig. 1 executes the XPath query (sink) at line 18. This query 
compares the password—stored in the XML attribute password —
for one of the entries in users.xml with the one accessed from 
an input source (the POST parameter password ). In the exam- 
ple, the user inputs are sanitized at lines 16 and 17 by invoking 
Fig. 3. The system dependence graph (SDG) of the program in Fig. 1 . 
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Fig. 4. The backward program slice with respect to the sink at line 18 in Fig. 1 . 
methods from the OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) ( OWASP, 
2015a ), which provides a rich set of sanitization functions for var- 
ious vulnerability types. If the user input was used directly in the 
sink without such sanitization, the sink could be subject to XPathi 
attacks. For example, in the case of users.xml , by just know- 
ing a user name, an attacker could launch a tautology attack using 
the value ‘ or ’1‘ = ’1 as password , gaining access to the 
user’s credential data. 
Likewise, in the absence of any sanitization, the operation at 
line 26 would be vulnerable to XMLi attacks. More speciﬁcally, at 
line 26 an XML tag is created with a user input using string con- 
catenation. If the user inputs stored in account and password 
were not sanitized, as they are at lines 22 and 23, a user could 
compromise the integrity of the XML ﬁle by using one of the fol- 
lowing meta-characters: < > / ’ = ”. 
2.3. Program slicing 
Our terminology and deﬁnitions regarding security slicing are 
based on those of Hammer (2009) since we rely on his program 
slicing approach and tool. Given a Web program, our security 
slices are extracted using program dependence graphs, system de- 
pendence graphs, backward program slices, and forward program 
slices of the program. The deﬁnitions for these concepts are pro- 
vided below. 
Deﬁnition 1. Program Dependence Graph ( Ferrante et al., 1987 ). A 
program dependence graph (PDG) is a directed graph G = (N, E) , 
where N is the set of nodes representing the statements of a given 
procedure in a program, and E is the set of control-dependence 
and data-dependence edges that induce a partial order on the 
nodes in N . 
Since a PDG can only represent an individual procedure, slicing 
on an PDG merely results in intraprocedural slices. For comput- 
ing program slices from interprocedural programs, Horwitz et al. 
(1990) deﬁned system dependence graphs, which are essentially 
interprocedural program dependence graphs from which interpro- 
cedural program slices can be soundly and eﬃciently computed. 
Deﬁnition 2. System Dependence Graph ( Horwitz et al., 1990 ). A 
system dependence graph consists of all the PDGs in the program, 
which are connected using interprocedural edges that reﬂect calls 
between procedures. This means that each procedure in a program 
is represented by a PDG. The PDG is modiﬁed to contain formal-in 
and formal-out nodes for every formal parameter of the procedure. 
Each call-site in the PDG is also modiﬁed to contain actual-in and 
actual-out nodes for each actual parameter. The call node is con- 
nected to the entry node of the invoked procedure via a call edge. 
The actual-in nodes are connected to their corresponding formal-in 
nodes via parameter-in edges, and the actual-out nodes are con- 
nected to their corresponding formal-out nodes via parameter-out 
edges. Lastly, summary edges are inserted between actual-in and 
actual-out nodes of the same call-site to reﬂect transitive data- 
dependencies that may occur in the called procedure. 
Since an SDG provides an interprocedural model of a 
program—capturing interprocedural data-dependencies, control- 
dependencies, and call-dependencies—it is the ideal data structure 
for program analysis. Furthermore, program slices can be com- 
puted from it in a sound and eﬃcient way in linear time ( Horwitz 
et al., 1990; Ottenstein and Ottenstein, 1984 ). More speciﬁcally, the 
worst-case complexity of building a program slice from an SDG of 
N nodes is O ( N ); the worst-case complexity of building an SDG it- 
self is O ( N 3 ) ( Hammer, 2009 ). 
Fig. 3 depicts the SDG of the program in Fig. 1 . The en- 
try points of the methods allowUser() , createUser() , 
encodeForXpath() , encodeForXMLAttribute() and the 
main entry point doPost() are represented as SDG nodes 
(shaded boxes). The other nodes (white boxes), which represent 
the expressions of the program in Fig. 1 , are connected with 
control-dependence edges (black lines), data-dependence edges 
(black arrows) and summary edges (dotted black arrows). Call 
edges (dashed arrows with black arrowheads) connect call sites 
with their respective targets, whereas dashed arrows with white 
arrowheads denote parameter edges. Input sources are highlighted 
with a solid dashed frame, whereas sinks are highlighted with a 
blank dashed frame. 
Deﬁnition 3. Backward Program Slice ( Horwitz et al., 1990 ). Given 
an SDG G = (N, E) , let K ⊆ N be the set of identiﬁed sinks. The 
backward program slice of G with respect to a target criterion k 
∈ K , denoted with bs ( k ), consists of all the statements that inﬂu- 
ence k , and is deﬁned as bs (k ) = { j ∈ N | j ∗−→ k } , where j ∗−→ k 
denotes that there exists an interprocedurally-realizable path from j 
to k , so that k is reachable through a set of preceding statements 
(possibly across procedures). The detailed algorithms for comput- 
ing interprocedurally-realizable paths and backward slice are given 
in Horwitz et al. (1990) . 
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Fig. 5. Forward slice with respect to the slicing criterion at line 2 in Fig. 1 . 
As illustrated in Fig. 4 , the backward program slice with respect 
to the sink at line 18 in Fig. 1 contains all the program statements 
that inﬂuence (both intraprocedurally and interprocedurally) the 
operation of the sink. 
Deﬁnition 4. Forward Program Slice ( Bergeretti and Carré, 1985 ). 
Given an SDG G = (N, E) , let I ⊆N be the source criterion. The for- 
ward program slice of G with respect to I consists of all the nodes 
that are inﬂuenced by I , and is deﬁned as f s (I) = { j ∈ N | i ∗−→ 
j ∧ i ∈ I} 
The program in Fig. 1 contains three input sources at lines 2–4; 
Fig. 5 shows the forward program slice with respect to the input 
source account at line 2. 
Deﬁnition 5. Program Chop ( Jackson and Rollins, 1994; Reps and 
Rosay, 1995 ). The program chop of an SDG G = (N, E) with the 
source criterion I and the target criterion k is deﬁned as c(I, k ) = 
bs (k ) ∩ f s (I) . 
Note that program chopping is deﬁned as the intersection 
of backward slicing and forward slicing. It allows us to identify 
security-relevant nodes that are on the paths from I to k and, thus, 
involved in the propagation of potentially malicious data from in- 
put sources to a sink. 
For example, Fig. 6 shows a chop between the input sources 
getParameter() on line 2-4 and the sink xpath.evaluate() 
on line 18. 
3. Overview of the approach 
Our fully-automated approach mainly targets Java-based Web 
applications, since the type of vulnerabilities it supports are com- 
monplace in such systems. We emphasize that a specialized ap- 
proach is necessary to provide practical support for the security 
auditing of Web applications and services developed using a spe- 
ciﬁc technology. 
When extracting security slices, we aim to achieve the follow- 
ing objectives: 
1. Soundness: A security slice shall contain all the relevant pro- 
gram statements enabling the auditing of any security violation. 
2. Precision: A security slice shall contain only the program state- 
ments relevant to minimizing the auditing effort. 
3. Performance: The security slicing algorithm shall handle Web 
applications of realistic size. 
Achieving all these objectives is desirable but in practice there 
is a trade-off between soundness and precision, depending on the 
analysis goal. In our context, we prioritize soundness because ﬁnd- 
ing all the possible security violations is a priority for security au- 
diting; nevertheless, we also try to optimize precision to the extent 
possible. 
The pseudocode of the algorithm realizing our security slicing 
approach is shown in Fig. 7 . The algorithm takes as input: the byte- 
code W of a Java program; a set M 〈 IR, KG 〉 of methods (custom func- 
tions or library API) that are either irrelevant to security analysis 
of XSS, SQLi, XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi, or that may be relevant to 
security but are known (or assumed) to be correct or free from 
security issues; a set 〈 I, K, D 〉 of sources, sinks, and declassiﬁers 
(nodes in the SDG that represent sanitization procedures). The al- 
gorithm returns the set SS of security slices and associated path 
conditions extracted from W . 
The algorithm works as follows. After initializing SS to the 
empty set, it constructs the SDG from the bytecode W of the input 
program; this step is realized by using the API of Joana ( Hammer, 
2009 ). The resulting SDG is then ﬁltered by pruning nodes that 
contain methods belonging to M 〈 IR, KG 〉 ; the details of this step are 
described in Section 4.3 . The next step identiﬁes the set of input 
sources I and sinks K from the SDG. Afterwards, the algorithm iter- 
ates through the set K ; for all sinks k ∈ K , it performs the following 
steps: 
1. Computing the program chop c ( I, k ), to extract the program 
slice that contains the statements inﬂuenced by the set of in- 
put sources I , which lead to sink k through possibly different 
program paths. This step is realized using the API of Joana . 
2. Performing information ﬂow control (IFC) analysis to identify 
how insecure the information ﬂows along the paths in c ( I, 
k ) are. This step, partially supported by Joana , is described 
in Section 4.1 . 
3. Performing context analysis to identify the context of sink and 
to understand whether input data is used in an insecure way 
in a sink. This analysis automatically patches vulnerable sinks 
with sanitization procedures if it is able to identify adequate 
procedures from the extracted path conditions PC . If this is not 
possible, the extracted information can still be used to facilitate 
manual security auditing (e.g., checking feasible conditions for 
security attacks). This step is detailed in Section 4.2 . 
Each of the last three steps is combined with a ﬁltering pro- 
cedure, based on the extracted information ﬂow traces and path 
conditions; the ﬁltering procedures are explained in Section 4.3 . 
Furthermore, each iteration terminates by computing a security 
slicess ( I, k ) and its path conditions PC , which are then added to set 
SS . 
4. Detailed steps 
4.1. Information ﬂow control analysis 
Information Flow Control Analysis (IFC) analysis is a technique 
that checks whether a software system conforms to a security 
speciﬁcation. Relying on the work of Hammer (2009) , we adapt 
his generic ﬂow-, context-, and object-sensitive interprocedural IFC 
analysis framework to suit our speciﬁc information ﬂow problem 
with respect to XSS, SQLi, XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi. Our goal is to 
trace how information from an input source can reach a sink, and 
then to analyze which paths in the chops are secure and which 
ones may not be secure. 
We specify allowed and disallowed information ﬂow based 
on a lattice called security lattice , i.e., a partial-ordered set that 
expresses the relation between different security levels. We use 
the standard diamond lattice L LH ( Myers et al., 2006 ), depicted 
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Fig. 6. The chop with the source criterion {2, 3, 4} and the target criterion {18} of the example program in Fig. 1 . 
Fig. 7. Security slicing algorithm. 
Fig. 8. The security lattice used in our information ﬂow control analysis. 
in Fig. 8 , which expresses the relation between four security levels 
HL, HH, LL , and LH . Every level l = L 0 L 1 contains two components: 
L 0 denotes the conﬁdentiality level while L 1 denotes the integrity 
level. Conﬁdentiality requires that information is to be prevented 
from ﬂowing into inappropriate destinations or sinks, whereas in- 
tegrity requires that information is to be prevented from ﬂowing 
from inappropriate input sources ( Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003 ). The 
element HL represents the most restricted usage, since any data 
labeled with it cannot ﬂow to any destination that has a different 
security label. Data labeled with HH are conﬁdential and cannot be 
manipulated by an attacker, whereas data labeled with LH are non- 
conﬁdential and also cannot be manipulated by an attacker. The LL 
label is used for data that are non-conﬁdential but could be altered 
by an attacker. 
All input sources and sinks are annotated with a security la- 
bel that enables the detection of allowed and disallowed informa- 
tion ﬂow. This annotation step is done automatically based on our 
predeﬁned sets of input sources and sinks (see Section 2.2 ). Input 
sources are labeled with HL because data originating from them 
are supposed to be conﬁdential but could be manipulated by an 
attacker. Sinks are labeled either with LH or with HH . The value 
of the conﬁdentiality label is either L or H , depending on whether 
the sink is allowed or not to handle user conﬁdential data. In any 
case, the integrity label for sinks is always H , because only high- 
integrity data should be allowed to ﬂow into the sinks, to prevent 
the ﬂow of malicious input values causing security attacks. More 
speciﬁcally, in our approach we label as HH the sink functions that 
update or modify databases—since it is common to store highly- 
conﬁdential data in back-end databases—as well as the functions 
that access server environment variables, read data from conﬁg- 
uration ﬁles or other sources. Moreover, we label as LH the sink 
functions that generate outputs to external environments, such as 
exception handling functions, as well as functions that read time 
and date such as getTime() from java.util.Calendar . Fi- 
nally, an example of function labeled with LL is a function that 
monitors mouse-clicks. 
Based on these annotations, the IFC analysis traces information 
ﬂow from one node in the chop to another and detects disallowed 
information ﬂow and, therefore, security violations. For example, 
a security violation is detected if there exists an information ﬂow 
from an LL input source to an HH sink. 
Notice that the annotation procedure must also take into ac- 
count the fact that program developers might use sanitization pro- 
cedures to properly validate data from an input source before using 
it in a sink. For instance, this is the case for our running example 
in Fig. 1 , where proper sanitization procedures (lines 16 and 17 
and 22 and 23) taken from the OWASP security library ( OWASP, 
2015a ) are used between the input sources and a sink. Such cases 
can be considered secure and do not need to be reported to an 
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auditor. To support the use of these functions, we rely on the con- 
cept of declassiﬁcation ( Sabelfeld and Sands, 2005 ). In our context, 
declassiﬁers are nodes in the SDG that represent sanitization pro- 
cedures. The integrity level of such nodes is annotated with an H 
label since the sanitization procedure ensures the integrity of data. 
As we address ﬁve different vulnerability types, only the declas- 
siﬁers relevant to the vulnerability type of a sink k are annotated 
with the integrity level H . Other declassiﬁers in the chop c ( I, k ) and 
irrelevant for the vulnerability type of k are ignored. For example, 
the declassiﬁer at lines 16 and 17 in Fig. 1 is relevant for the XPath 
function xpath.evaluate() at line 18, but is inappropriate for 
a sink of a different vulnerability category, e.g., an SQL query oper- 
ation. 
In addition to annotating the integrity level of declassiﬁer nodes 
with H , we also change the integrity level of the data that reach 
these nodes to H . For example, as shown in Fig. 3 , the input sources 
account and password (lines 2 and 3 in Fig. 1 ) are annotated 
with the label HL . Since these input values pass through the de- 
classiﬁers at line 16 and 17 (highlighted in bold in Fig. 3 ), their 
security labels are changed to HH . When performing IFC analysis, 
the use of these variables in the sink node xpath.evaluate() 
at line 18 will be considered secure, because the information 
ﬂow from HH to HH is allowed. Our tool is conﬁgured with the 
declassiﬁers (mainly encoding and escaping functions) from two 
widely-used security libraries—Apache Common ( Apache, 2015b ) 
and OWASP (2015a ). It also recognizes the PreparedStatement 
function from the java.sql package as a declassiﬁer correspond- 
ing to SQL sinks. 
Consider now the same example above, but without san- 
itization functions. In such a case, we would have at least 
two illegal ﬂows (from account and password to the 
xpath.evaluate() call) from HL to HH . Hence, their corre- 
sponding paths would be determined as potentially insecure and 
will be subject to context analysis , explained in the next subsec- 
tion. 
4.2. Context analysis 
The IFC analysis illustrated above can tell if data from input 
sources may reach sinks. However, from a security auditing stand- 
point it is also necessary to understand the context of a sink, i.e., 
how the input data is used in a sink and if it is used in an insecure 
way. 
In this section, we present context analysis , a lightweight tech- 
nique for identifying the context (within a sink) in which the data 
of an input source is used. Based on the identiﬁed context, this 
technique is able to automatically ﬁx a vulnerable input source by 
applying the most appropriate sanitization function to it. 
Table 1 lists, for each type of vulnerability that we consider, the 
possible contexts (in the form of patterns, where input correspond 
to the data from an input source). For each context, we indicate 1 
the most appropriate security API (provided by OWASP, 2015a ) that 
should be used in that speciﬁc context to sanitize the input data. 
Context analysis is lightweight compared to symbolic evalua- 
tion and constraint solving approaches ( Kiezun et al., 2009; Zheng 
and Zhang, 2013 ) because it traverses only the paths leading to 
the sink rather than the whole program, and does not attempt to 
precisely reason about the operations performed in the path (e.g., 
by performing constraint solving). Instead, the analysis merely ex- 
amines the path conditions, i.e., the necessary conditions for the 
presence of information ﬂow from input sources I to a sink k via 
a program path. More speciﬁcally, context analysis relies on path 
1 Table 1 shows the mapping between context patterns and security API s as con- 
ﬁgured in our tool. Nevertheless, users can provide a different mapping. 
condition analysis to rule out infeasible paths, and to reconstruct 
the string values in the sink, needed to identify the context of the 
input source. The identiﬁed context is matched with the context 
patterns of Table 1 . In case of a match, context analysis applies the 
corresponding ﬁx, by wrapping the input source causing the vul- 
nerability with the proper security API. Otherwise, in case there is 
no match and the input source cannot be ﬁxed automatically, the 
procedure yields the path conditions, which represent a valuable 
asset for security analysts to understand the cause of a vulnerabil- 
ity. 
To explain this analysis, we use the code snippet shown 
in Fig. 9 and extracted from one of our test subjects WebGoat 
/ MultiLevelLogin1 (see Section 6 ). The code is vulnerable to 
XSS because the input data, which is accessed from a database 
(source at line 12) and displayed as content of an HTML page (sink 
at line 27), could be tampered with by an attacker before the data 
is stored in the database. 
Context analysis uses static single-assignment (SSA) 
form ( Cytron et al., 1991 ), a standard intermediate represen- 
tation used in program analysis. In SSA form, every variable in a 
program is assigned exactly once and every variable is deﬁned 
before it is used. For join points, i.e., points in the program where 
different control ﬂow paths merge together, a -operation is 
added to represent the different values that a variable can take 
at that point. Fig. 9 (b) shows the equivalent SSA form for the 
program in Fig. 9 (a). 
The pseudocode of our context analysis function is shown 
in Fig. 10 . It takes as input a security slice ss in a dependence 
graph form; it uses two local variables: PC , representing the set of 
preconditions analyzed, and P V , representing the set of potentially 
vulnerable paths. 
First, the input security slice ss is transformed by function 
genICFG into its equivalent interprocedural control ﬂow graph 
(ICFG) form ( Sinha et al., 2001 ), which shows the order of control 
ﬂow executions across procedures. In this form, the control ﬂow 
paths in the slice become explicit and can be easily extracted. 
Afterwards, function collectPaths extracts the control ﬂow 
paths by traversing the ICFG in a depth-ﬁrst search manner. For 
practicability (to avoid path explosion), loops and recursive func- 
tion calls are traversed only once; both our experience and the 
evidence gathered during our experiments conﬁrm that analyzing 
one iteration of loops and recursive calls is suﬃcient to detect vul- 
nerabilities. To illustrate this step, we use the ICFG of the program 
from Fig. 9 (b), shown in Fig. 11 . Every control ﬂow edge is labeled 
with a sequence number; outgoing predicate edges are annotated 
with TRUE or FALSE . In the ﬁgure, three control ﬂow paths can be 
observed: {(1, 8), (1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8), (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8)}. However, for 
this program, the IFC analysis described in Section 4.1 would have 
already pruned the paths {(1, 8), (1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8)} from the security 
slice, since there is no insecure information ﬂow in those paths. 
Hence, function collectPaths will return, in variable P V , only one 
potentially vulnerable path: P V = { (1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 7 , 8) } . 
The next step of the context analysis procedure is a loop that 
iterates over the set P V . For each path p ∈ P V , function evalPath 
tries to automatically ﬁx the vulnerability contained in p , if pos- 
sible. Function evalPath , which takes in input a path p , works as 
follows. First, the path conditions pc and the context of the input 
source ctx of path p are extracted with the eval procedure, de- 
scribed further below. Afterwards, function autoFix identiﬁes the 
required sanitization procedure by matching the extracted context 
ctx against one of the context patterns shown in Table 1 . If there 
is a match for ctx , the security API corresponding to the matched 
context pattern is applied to the input source; this automated ﬁx- 
ing procedure is further explained in Section 4.3 . If function aut- 
oFix returns a ﬁx, procedure removePath is invoked to prune the 
ﬁxed path from the security slice ss , and evalPath terminates 
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Table 1 
Mapping between contexts and security APIs for data sanitization. 
Vulnerability type No. Context pattern Security API 
XSS 1 HTML element content: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForHTML() 
< tag > input < /tag > 
2 HTML attribute value: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForHTMLAttribute() 
< div attr = ‘ input ’ > 
3 URL parameter value: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForURL() 
< a href = ’’http://... ?param = input ’’ > 
4 JavaScript variable value: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForJavaScript() 
< script > var a = ‘ input ’... < /script > 
< div onclick = ’’var a = ‘ input ’’’ > ... < /div > 
5 CSS property value: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForCSS() 
< style > selector {property: input ;} < /style > 
< span style = ’’property: input ’’ > ... < /span > 
SQLi 6 SQL attribute value: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForSQL() 
SELECT column From table WHERE 
row = ‘ input ’ 
XMLi 7 XML element content: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForXML() 
< node > input < /node > 
8 CDATA content: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForXML() 
< ![CDATA[ input ]] > 
9 XML attribute value: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForXMLAttribute() 
< node attr = ‘ input ’/ > 
XPathi 10 XPath attribute value: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForXPath() 
//table[column = ‘ input ’] 
LDAPi 11 LDAP distinguished name: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForDN() 
LdapName dn = new LdapName( input ) 
12 LDAP search: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForLDAP() 
search = ’’(attr = input )’’ 
Fig. 9. The Java source code (a) and the equivalent SSA form (b) of a sample program. 
Fig. 10. Context analysis algorithm. 
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Fig. 11. The control ﬂow graph of the program in Fig. 9 . 
returning null. If ﬁxing the vulnerability in p is not possible, the 
evalPath function returns the path condition pc corresponding to 
path p . The path conditions returned after executing the loop over 
P V are available in the set PC , which can be used by security audi- 
tors for manual inspection. 
The extraction of the path conditions and of the context of a 
path is done through function eval , which works as follows. It 
traces, in reverse control-ﬂow order starting from the sink, all the 
statements (in the SSA form) on which the sink variable is data- or 
control-dependent. Function traceBackwards collects all the vari- 
ables, their assignments and their interdependencies (stored in the 
map Vmap ), including the conditions Cond imposed on the vari- 
ables at predicate statements. Function resolveVariables resolves 
all variables until a ﬁxed point is reached; the variables used in 
the sink are resolved as a concatenation of the program-deﬁned 
values and the input variables. The result of the ﬁx-point iteration 
is stored in the map Vmap ′ , which is then used by the getSrc- 
SnkParams function to determine: 1) the variables that are associ- 
ated with the input source srcpar , i.e., the value that is returned by 
the source operation; 2) the sink parameter snkpar , i.e., the string 
that is passed to the operation in the sink. With this information, 
function getContext extracts the context of the input source with 
respect to the sink. The context is returned together with the con- 
joined conditions in Cond to the evalPath procedure and stored in 
variables ctx and pc . 
For example, after applying the eval procedure 
on the path p = (1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 7 , 8) in Fig. 11 , vari- 
able out 8 at the sink at line 27 is resolved to 
‘ < html >< p > 0 u 1 .toUpperCase() < /p >< /html > ’ , 
where u 1 represents the input variable assigned with the 
data from the input source at line 12. By matching this con- 
text against the context patterns of Table 1 , it is identiﬁed as 
an input used as the content of an HTML element . The corre- 
sponding security API ESAPI.encoder.encodeForHTML() 
is then used to patch the input source at line 12 
in Fig. 9 , resulting in the new statement String u = 
ESAPI.encoder.encodeForHTML(r.getString(1)) . 
Consider now the case in which the above vulnerable path 
p = (1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 7 , 8) could not be ﬁxed by function autoFix . The 
following path condition pc would be reported: 
DriverManager.getConnection(DB). 
prepareStatement(‘‘SELECT ∗...’’).executeQuery(). 
next() ∧ ¬u .isEmpty() . 
Based on this information, a security auditor may easily iden- 
tify that the path is feasible as long as there are user data in the 
database. Hence, she may conclude that a security attack is feasible 
since there is no sanitization of the user input. 
Note that our approach ﬁlters known-good classes (explained 
in the next subsection) such as those belonging to database 
drivers and database queries from the SDG. During SDG con- 
struction, those classes are replaced with stub nodes. Therefore, 
for the example above, the paths in the methods called by the 
DriverManager are not explored in our analysis. The consider- 
able reduction of the number of analyzed path improves the scal- 
ability of our approach, and results in a simpliﬁed path condition, 
from which an auditor can still assess its feasibility. 
4.3. Filtering 
In this section, we describe the ﬁve ﬁltering mechanisms ap- 
plied to generate minimal slices for security auditing. For eﬃciency 
reasons, the ﬁlters are applied at different stages of our approach 
(as shown in our security slicing algorithm in Fig. 7 ). Filters 1 and 
2 are applied concurrently during the SDG construction. Filter 3 is 
applied during program chopping. Filters 4 and 5 are applied to the 
program chops in sequence. We mentioned earlier that the goal of 
our work is to achieve the highest possible precision while preserv- 
ing soundness so that security auditing is scalable. 
The original program chops c ( I, k ) without ﬁlters are sound with 
respect to the types of input sources and sinks we consider, since 
all the statements related to those sources and sinks are extracted. 
It is straightforward to prove that by applying the ﬁltering rules 
illustrated below, which remove statements that cannot be rele- 
vant to security auditing, we achieve better precision compared to 
the original program chops. However, we also need to demonstrate 
that we maintain soundness by not removing any statement that 
might be relevant to security auditing when ﬁltering rules are ap- 
plied. Therefore, when deﬁning the ﬁltering rules below, we pro- 
vide arguments on how we preserve soundness . Further, we empir- 
ically demonstrate the soundness in Section 6 . 
The ﬁve ﬁltering mechanisms used in JoanAudit are: 
Filter 1: Irrelevant. It ﬁlters functions (custom functions or li- 
brary APIs) that are irrelevant to the security analysis of XSS, SQLi, 
XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi. Let M IR be the set of irrelevant functions. 
During the SDG construction, upon encountering a node that cor- 
responds to a function f ∈ M IR , a stub node is generated instead 
of the PDG that represents f . By doing so, all the nodes and edges 
that correspond to f are ﬁltered while not affecting the construc- 
tion of the SDG. For security auditing purposes, the stub node is 
annotated with the name of the function and labeled as irrelevant . 
Filter 2: Known-good. It ﬁlters functions with known-good secu- 
rity properties. Let M KG be the set of known-good functions. During 
the SDG construction, upon encountering a node that corresponds 
to a function f ∈ M KG , a stub node is generated instead of the PDG 
that represents f . Therefore, like the ﬁlter above, all the nodes and 
edges that correspond to f are ﬁltered in such a way as not to af- 
fect the construction of SDG. For security auditing purposes, the 
stub node is annotated with the name of the function and labeled 
as known-good . 
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Basically, the above two ﬁlters correspond to 1) functions that 
are known to be irrelevant to the auditing of XSS, SQLi, XMLi, 
XPathi, and LDAPi issues; and 2) functions that may be relevant 
to security but are known (or assumed) to be correct or free from 
security issues. Hence, it is clear that ﬁltering such functions does 
not affect the soundness of our approach. 
For example, we observed that Java methods be- 
longing to classes responsible for retrieving the HTTP 
GET and POST parameters (e.g., those implementing the 
javax.servlet.ServletRequest interface) are commonly 
present in the original program chops; however — differently 
from the parameters they retrieve — these methods are irrelevant 
for our security analysis purpose because they contain neither 
input sanitization operations nor security-sensitive operations 
concerning XSS, SQLi, XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi vulnerabilities. 
Example functions excluded by the known-good ﬁlter are the ones 
provided by widely-used security libraries, such as Apache (2015b ) 
and OWASP (2015a ) (e.g., the methods of the classes implementing 
the org.owasp.esapi.Encoder interface); these functions are 
assumed to be correct and thus do not require auditing. 
In our tool, we predeﬁne 12 functions as irrelevant and 50 func- 
tions as known-good . Program developers or security auditors may 
need to extend these sets of functions based on their domain 
knowledge; these sets can be easily deﬁned in our tool through 
a conﬁguration ﬁle. 
Filter 3: No input. It ﬁlters sinks that are not inﬂuenced by any 
input source. This ﬁltering is easily done by performing the pro- 
gram chopping with the source criterion I and the sink criterion k . 
The resulting chop c ( I, k ) would be empty. 
The sinks that are not inﬂuenced by any input sources cannot 
cause any security issues; thus, they are not relevant to security 
auditing. This implies that the resulting code, after applying Filter 
3, is still sound and yet more precise. 
Filter 4: Declassiﬁcation. It ﬁlters out the secure paths from chop 
c ( I, k ). Let D k ⊆N be the set of declassiﬁer nodes in SDG that cor- 
responds to the type of sink k . Let P be a set of paths from input 
sources I to k . If there is a declassiﬁer node d ∈ D k on a path p ∈ 
P , then the path p is removed from c ( I, k ). 
The presence of a declassiﬁer on a path p in c ( I, k ), which 
is adequate for securing the sink, ensures that values from input 
sources are properly validated and sanitized before being used in 
k , as far as path p is concerned. Hence, the resulting code after 
ﬁltering such paths is still sound and yet more precise. 
This ﬁlter is applied using the IFC analysis discussed 
in Section 4.1 . We use information ﬂow control to ﬁlter out— from 
the set of paths that are returned to the security auditor—the paths 
that do not contain any violation according to the L LH lattice. 
Filter 5: Automated ﬁxing. It automatically ﬁxes the paths from 
input sources I to sink k that can be identiﬁed as deﬁnitely vul- 
nerable and that can be properly ﬁxed without user intervention. 
Let P be the set of remaining paths from chop c ( I, k ) after applying 
Filter 4 . If a path p ∈ P identiﬁed as vulnerable can be ﬁxed by ap- 
plying an adequate security API, then the path p is removed from 
c ( I, k ). This ﬁlter corresponds to the autoFix procedure described 
in Section 4.2 . 
Automated ﬁxing is not possible for all cases, especially 
when an input passes through complex string operations, like 
substring() and replace() , which are not addressed by our 
analysis. This is because there might be custom sanitization on 
the path using operations like replace() and in that case, ap- 
plying another sanitization procedure on the path could affect the 
integrity of the input data and may not ﬁx the security issue as in- 
tended. Therefore, automated ﬁxing is only applied for the inputs 
directly used in the sink or for the inputs that only pass through 
simple string operations like concat() , toUpperCase() , and 
trim() , which do not have any (sanitization) effect on the input. 
For example, as discussed in Section 4.2 , for the program in Fig. 9 , 
the ﬁxing is applied to the input at line 12 because it only passes 
through the concat() and toUpperCase() operations before 
it is used in the sink. Fixing is also not possible when our analy- 
sis cannot determine the appropriate sanitization procedure to use, 
for example when it cannot identify the matching context due to 
complex code. 
Anyway, since we apply the ﬁlter only on the paths that can 
be appropriately ﬁxed, the resulting report after this ﬁlter is still 
sound and yet more precise for security auditing. 
5. Implementation 
We implemented our approach in a command-line tool called 
JoanAudit , written in Java and publicly available ( Thomé, 2015 ). It 
comprises approximately 11 kLOC, excluding library code. The tool 
is based on Joana ( Hammer, 2009 ), which is based on IBM’s Wala 
framework ( IBM, 2013 ). Joana provides APIs for SDG generation 
from Java bytecode, program slicing, and IFC analysis. Our tool also 
directly uses Wala ’s APIs for some functionalities like ICFG genera- 
tion and code optimization. 
The tool is conﬁgured with two XML ﬁles, config.xml and 
lattice.xml . The ﬁrst ﬁle contains a list of Java bytecode sig- 
natures for 74 input sources, 58 sinks, and 27 declassiﬁers; this 
list corresponds to the set 〈 I,K,D 〉 in the security slicing algo- 
rithm shown in Fig. 7 . The config.xml ﬁle also speciﬁes the list 
of bytecode signatures for 50 known-good APIs and 12 irrelevant 
APIs; this list corresponds to the set M 〈 IR, KG 〉 in Fig. 7 , used in Fil- 
ter 1 and Filter 2 . The lattice.xml ﬁle speciﬁes a conﬁguration 
for the security lattice explained in Section 4.1 . Both ﬁles are con- 
ﬁgurable by users to suit their security analysis needs. For exam- 
ple, based on their domain knowledge, developers can specify in 
config.xml additional input sources, sinks, and custom declas- 
siﬁers used in their applications. Thanks to this user-deﬁned addi- 
tional conﬁguration, the tool will not skip analyzing other security- 
sensitive operations, and will not falsely report as insecure the 
paths containing custom declassiﬁers. Similarly, different security 
lattices (e.g., with ﬁner-grained security levels) can be deﬁned in 
lattice.xml . 
Fig. 12 illustrates the architecture of the tool. Given a Java 
Web application, JoanAudit performs the analysis steps presented 
in Sections 3 and 4 . The bytecode of the application is converted 
to an intermediate representation based on the SSA form, which 
is then processed by the analysis steps. However, to facilitate se- 
curity auditing, the tool outputs the security slice in source code 
format. The block labeled SDG Builder corresponds to the step at 
line 3 in Fig. 7 , which generates the SDG of the input program. The 
block labeled Annotator corresponds to the step at line 5 in Fig. 7 , 
which annotates the SDG with input sources, sinks, and declassi- 
ﬁers. Based on the annotations in SDG, the tool generates a pro- 
gram chop for each sink (line 7 in Fig. 7 ). Sinks that are not inﬂu- 
enced by any input source are ﬁltered upon chopping ( Filter 3 ). The 
block labeled IFC Analyzer performs on each chop the IFC analysis 
described in Section 4.1 . After computing 2 the ICFG from the an- 
notated SDG by means of the ICFG builder block (based on Wala ’s 
API), for each chop, JoanAudit extracts the corresponding ICFG sub- 
graph, from which the secure paths determined from the IFC anal- 
ysis are ﬁltered ( Filter 4 ). The block labeled Context Analyzer per- 
forms context analysis (described in Section 4.2 ) on the remaining 
paths. As part of this analysis, the block Autofix Engine attempts 
to patch, when feasible, the source code with the required security 
2 The tool keeps the mapping of the nodes between the SDG and the ICFG be- 
cause, in ICFG, the control ﬂow execution paths are explicit whereas in SDG, the 
control- and data-dependencies are explicit. Hence, both types of models are com- 
plementary and required by our analysis. 
776 J. Thomé et al. / The Journal of Systems and Software 137 (2018) 766–783 
Fig. 12. The architecture of our tool JoanAudit . 
Fig. 13. Excerpt of the report generated by JoanAudit . 
Fig. 14. Path conditions retuned by JoanAudit . 
API, as described in Section 4.3 ( Filter 5 ). As output, the tool gen- 
erates a report that guides the security auditor in auditing poten- 
tially vulnerable parts of the program. An excerpt of report gener- 
ated for one of our test subjects ( WebGoat , see Section 6 ) is shown 
in Fig. 13 . 
The report contains potentially vulnerable paths (denoted as se- 
quences of line numbers) and highlights the control-ﬂow, data- 
dependencies, control-dependencies, and path conditions along 
these paths. The scopes (i.e., the classes to which the line numbers 
refer to) are parenthesized with squared brackets. The path condi- 
tions extracted during context analysis are returned in the format 
shown in Fig. 14 , in which sink and source variables are denoted 
with snk and input , respectively. 
6. Evaluation 
6.1. Research questions 
To evaluate whether our approach achieves precision, sound- 
ness and run-time performance when providing assistance to secu- 
rity auditing, we aim to answer the following research questions: 
RQ1 (Precision) How much reduction can be expected from secu- 
rity slicing in terms of source code to be inspected? Is the 
reduction practically signiﬁcant? 
RQ2 (Soundness) Do we extract all the statements that are rele- 
vant to auditing XSS, SQLi, XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi vulnera- 
bilities? 
RQ3 (Performance) Does the tool scale to realistic systems in 
terms of run-time performance? 
6.2. Test subjects 
Table 2 shows the 9 Web applications/services that we used 
in our evaluation. WebGoat ( OWASP, 2015b ) is a deliberately in- 
secured Web application/service for the purpose of teaching se- 
curity vulnerabilities. It contains various realistic vulnerabilities 
that are commonly found in Java Web applications. Apache Roller 
( Apache, 2015a ) and Pebble (2015) are blogging applications that 
also expose a Web service APIs. Regain (2015) is a search engine 
that allows users to search for ﬁles over a Web front-end. PubSub 
( PubSubHubbub, 2015 ) is the implementation of the open proto- 
col PubSubHubbub for distributed publish/subscribe communication 
( Network Working Group, 2014 ), which is supported by many blog- 
ging applications and also used to access newsfeeds on the Inter- 
net. rest-auth-proxy is an LDAP-based Web service that authenti- 
cates users against an LDAP directory. 
We selected WebGoat , Apache Roller , and Pebble since they are 
commonly used as benchmarks for security ( Livshits and Lam, 
20 05; Tripp et al., 20 09 ; Liu and Milanova, 2009 ; Xie et al., 2011; 
Tripp et al., 2013; Møller and Schwarz, 2014 ). The choice of Re- 
gain was driven by the fact that it is used in a production-grade 
system by dm , one of the biggest drugstore chains in Europe. TPC- 
App, TPC-C , and TPC-W are the benchmarks used by Antunes and 
Vieira (2015) for evaluating vulnerability detection tools for Web 
services; these benchmarks contain a set of Web services accepted 
as representative of real environments by the Transactions process- 
ing Performance Council ( http://www.tpc.org ). The PubSub tool was 
chosen because it is the most popular Java project related to the 
PubSubHubbub protocol in the Google Code archive ( Google, 2017 ). 
Similarly, we selected rest-auth-proxy because it was one of the 
ﬁrst Java projects returned by a query on Github.com with the 
search string ldap rest . 
Table 2 also reports the sizes of the test subjects in terms of 
lines of code (LOC), excluding the library code. The test subjects 
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Table 2 
Test subjects. 
Java #Prog. #Sources #Sinks #Declassiﬁers 
LOC XML XPath XSS LDAP SQL Others XML XPath XSS LDAP SQL Others 
WebGoat 5.2 24,608 14 34 1 1 35 0 29 2 0 0 0 0 21 0 
Roller 5.1.1 52,433 3 14 10 0 13 0 0 0 8 0 3 0 0 0 
Pebble 2.6.4 36,592 3 6 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Regain 2.1.0 23,182 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 
PubSub 0.3 1964 3 3 10 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
TPC-App 2082 6 22 0 0 2 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 
TPC-C 9184 6 16 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 58 0 
TPC-W 2470 6 6 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 
rest-auth-proxy 442 1 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 152,957 43 106 21 3 57 4 66 3 11 0 5 0 96 3 
have an average size of 17 kLOC, and the largest one has 52 kLOC, 
which is fairly typical for that type of systems. The third column 
in Table 2 shows the numbers of Web programs ( #Prog. ), i.e., JSP, 
Java servlets and classes, contained in each test subject and an- 
alyzed by our tool JoanAudit . The table also reports the numbers 
of input sources ( #Sources ), sinks ( #Sinks ), and declassiﬁers ( #De- 
classiﬁers ) that JoanAudit identiﬁed. For sinks and declassiﬁers, the 
numbers are shown separately with respect to XSS, SQLi, XMLi, 
XPathi, and LDAPi. Some sinks are very general and are exploitable 
in various ways (e.g., sinks that allow attackers to load arbitrary 
classes server-side). Due to their universality, we also considered 
them in our evaluation and their number is listed in column oth- 
ers in Table 2 . 
All these test subjects can be obtained from the tool web- 
site ( Thomé, 2015 ). 
6.3. Results 
We ran our evaluation on a Apple MacBook Pro with an Intel 
Core i7 (2 GHz) and 8 GB of RAM, running Mac OS X 10.11, JVM 
version 25.31-b07, Joana rev. 688, Wala v.1.1.3, and OWASP ESAPI 
2.0. 
6.3.1. Precision 
To answer RQ1, we compared the size of the slices produced by 
JoanAudit (hereafter referred to as “security slices”) with the size 
of the slices produced by the state-of-the-art chopping implemen- 
tation provided by Joana (hereafter referred to as “normal chops”) 
extended with source/sink identiﬁcation capabilities; in terms of 
size, we considered both the number of nodes and the number of 
edges. More speciﬁcally, for each sink k , we computed a security 
slice using our approach and a normal chop with the criterion ( I, 
k ). We used the Wilcoxon signed-rank test over the slice sizes across 
Web programs in order to determine whether the differences in 
sizes of the two types of slices were statistically signiﬁcant. We 
also discuss whether this difference is of practical signiﬁcance in 
terms of auditing effort. 
As shown in Table 2 , we analyzed 43 Web programs from the 9 
test subjects. For each Web program, an SDG was constructed. We 
computed normal chops and security slices from each SDG. The 
results are shown in Table 3 . Overall, we computed 154 normal 
chops ( #ch ) and 39 security slices ( #ss ) from 106 sources and 154 
sinks. The size (in terms of #nodes and #edges) of SDGs, normal 
chops, and security slices are shown in columns SDG, Chopping , and 
SecuritySlicing , respectively. Column #ss reports the ﬁnal output of 
JoanAudit , i.e., the numbers of remaining security slices that require 
auditing after ﬁltering has been performed. Some of the computed 
security slices are completely ﬁltered (i.e., #ss = 0) when, for exam- 
ple, all the paths in a slice are detected to be secured because of 
the presence of declassiﬁers. Furthermore, the last four columns 
in Table 3 show the effectiveness of the ﬁve different ﬁlters pre- 
sented in Section 4.3 , in terms of the number of nodes that are 
ﬁltered. 
To determine the amount of reduction achieved by security slic- 
ing when compared to normal chopping, we computed the relative 
size reduction of security slices with respect to (unﬁltered) normal 
chop. The results (in percentage) are given in the columns (N%) and 
(E%) in Table 3 . These results show that our security slices are sig- 
niﬁcantly smaller than their counterparts obtained through normal 
chopping, in terms of both the number of nodes and the number 
of edges. As shown in the last two rows of the table, our approach 
achieved mean and median reductions of 76% and 100%, respec- 
tively, in terms of the number of nodes, and 79% and 100%, re- 
spectively, in terms of the number of edges. More importantly, 115 
chops were completely dropped by the ﬁlters, meaning that only 
39 out of total 154 chops require manual auditing (see columns 
#ch and #ss ). Hence, one can expect signiﬁcant practical beneﬁts 
by adopting our approach. The Wilcoxon signed-rank tests over 43 
observations ( #Prog. ) show that the size reductions achieved with 
security slices are statistically signiﬁcant at a 99% level of signiﬁ- 
cance. 
From the last four columns in Table 3 , we can also observe how 
much each type of ﬁlters contributed. The known-good and irrele- 
vant library-code-ﬁlters (F1 + F2) signiﬁcantly reduced the SDG size 
for all the test subjects. This can be explained by the fact that ap- 
plications typically contain a large chunk of library code. The no in- 
put ﬁlter (F3) also signiﬁcantly pruned many nodes (74,776 nodes 
in total) since those nodes are not inﬂuenced by any input source. 
The declassiﬁcation ﬁlter (F4) signiﬁcantly pruned many nodes from 
the standard chops (36 45 nodes in total), for all the test subjects 
except rest-auth-proxy . The automated ﬁxing ﬁlter (F5) was signiﬁ- 
cant for WebGoat, PubSub , and TPC-W (751 nodes were pruned in 
total). 
To conclude, by comparing the security slice sizes and the SDG 
sizes in Table 3 , we can observe that on average security slic- 
ing would require the audit of approximately 1% of the code for 
all the sinks in a given Web application. Since the security slices 
computed by our approach are based on the control-ﬂow paths 
between sinks and sources, the size reduction of security slicing 
achieved with JoanAudit is directly correlated to the reduction of 
the manual effort required from security auditors for verifying vul- 
nerable paths in the source code. Hence, these results answer RQ1 
by clearly suggesting that a signiﬁcant reduction in code inspection 
can be expected when using our approach. 
We also remark that the above comparison shows the beneﬁt 
of security slicing over normal chopping, with the latter performed 
by using a tool ( Joana ) that is also not easy to conﬁgure and use 
for standard engineers. Furthermore, for situations where security 
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Table 3 
Comparison between the size of the slices obtained with normal chopping and the size of the slices obtained with security slicing (#ch: number of normal chops; N%: 
reduction of nodes in percentage; E%: reduction of edges in percentage; #ss: number of security slices; F1–F5: numbers of nodes ﬁltered by each of the proposed ﬁve 
ﬁlters). 
SDG Chopping SecuritySlicing Filtering 
Program name Nodes Edges Nodes Edges #ch Nodes (N%) Edges (E%) #ss F1 + F2 F3 F4 F5 
WebGoat 160,573 923,709 16,359 19,405 68 3902 76 3916 80 21 133,389 21,007 1746 529 
1. BackDoors 11,196 63,350 210 229 1 171 19 172 25 1 10,367 658 0 0 
2. BlindNumericSqlInjection 9573 52,262 721 813 6 0 100 0 100 0 7637 1600 211 125 
3. BlindScript 21,558 140,134 1072 1296 3 318 70 322 75 3 20,634 606 0 0 
4. BlindStringSqlInjection 9616 52,580 721 813 6 0 100 0 100 0 7654 1626 211 125 
5. InsecureLogin 11,998 68,257 2205 2630 5 673 69 673 74 2 9864 1410 51 0 
6. MultiLevelLogin1 13,525 80,281 969 1341 4 0 100 0 100 0 11,918 1126 481 0 
7. MultiLevelLogin2 12,546 71,773 1696 2172 6 670 60 676 69 1 9263 2504 109 0 
8. SqlAddData 10,565 58,219 1535 1756 8 169 89 170 90 2 8617 1365 336 78 
9. SqlModifyData 10,623 58,350 1606 1827 12 233 85 234 87 3 8549 1386 343 112 
10. SqlNumericInjection 13,576 77,717 1712 2028 5 376 78 376 81 2 11,845 1354 1 0 
11. SqlStringInjection 12,155 69,502 2134 2479 5 567 73 567 77 3 9923 1664 1 0 
12. WsSAXInjection 8075 45,164 833 940 3 352 58 352 63 2 4 4 48 3274 1 0 
13. WsSqlInjection 9191 49,232 820 940 3 373 55 374 60 2 7338 1479 1 0 
14. XPATHInjection 6376 36,888 125 141 1 0 100 0 100 0 5332 955 0 89 
Roller 16,361 142,811 2562 3110 23 353 86 353 89 1 12,614 2812 582 0 
15. CommentDataServlet 11,119 115,398 1354 1607 12 353 74 353 78 1 9242 1298 226 0 
16. AuthorizationServlet 752 3578 101 120 1 0 100 0 100 0 97 651 4 0 
17. OpenSearchServlet 4490 23,835 1107 1383 10 0 100 0 100 0 3275 863 352 0 
Pebble 1605 7824 560 717 7 3 99 2 100 1 529 986 87 0 
18. ImageCaptchaServlet 829 4033 536 697 1 0 100 0 100 0 470 293 66 0 
19. SecurityUtils 236 1128 21 18 5 0 100 0 100 0 28 187 21 0 
20. XmlRpcController 540 2663 3 2 1 3 0 2 0 1 31 506 0 0 
Regain 43,197 622,748 474 568 1 0 100 0 100 0 28,562 14,458 177 0 
21. FileServlet 43,197 622,748 474 568 1 0 100 0 100 0 28,562 14,458 177 0 
PubSubHubbub 3313 17,281 207 208 12 0 100 0 100 0 2209 899 142 63 
22. Discovery 160 726 63 63 2 0 100 0 100 0 0 97 0 63 
23. Publisher 1896 10,097 45 44 5 0 100 0 100 0 1405 446 45 0 
24. Subscriber 1257 6458 99 101 5 0 100 0 100 0 804 356 97 0 
TPC-App 190,177 1,198,618 1125 1309 9 99 91 97 93 2 161,378 28,459 198 43 
25. ChangePaymentMethod_Vx0 9671 56,074 166 179 2 0 100 0 100 0 9368 165 138 0 
26. ChangePaymentMethod_VxA 10,151 58,890 49 48 1 49 0 48 0 1 9773 329 0 0 
27. ProductDetails_Vx0 10,330 59,197 420 506 2 0 100 0 100 0 10,103 183 44 0 
28. ProductDetails_VxA 10,554 60,414 434 522 2 50 88 49 91 1 10,316 185 3 0 
29. NewProducts_Vx0 74,609 481,203 13 12 1 0 100 0 100 0 60,803 13,793 13 0 
30. NewProducts_VxA 74,862 482,840 43 42 1 0 100 0 100 0 61,015 13,804 0 43 
TPC-C 92,559 56 8,6 80 1860 1932 24 1044 44 1048 46 10 87,424 3471 620 0 
31. Delivery_Vx0 13,606 81,511 266 276 7 0 100 0 100 0 12,577 775 254 0 
32. Delivery_VxA 16,130 97,431 493 503 3 405 18 408 19 3 14,903 822 0 0 
33. OrderStatus_Vx0 18,963 120,016 287 301 5 0 100 0 100 0 18,083 614 266 0 
34. OrderStatus_VxA 20,395 129,702 476 490 5 455 4 457 7 5 19,287 653 0 0 
35. NewStockLevel_Vx0 11,266 67,071 127 139 2 0 100 0 100 0 10,871 295 100 0 
36. NewStockLevel_VxA 12,199 72,949 211 223 2 184 13 183 18 2 11,703 312 0 0 
TPC-W 63,290 365,728 213 209 6 0 100 0 100 0 60,698 2383 93 116 
37. DoSubjectSearch_Vx0 10,347 59,748 26 25 1 0 100 0 100 0 9947 374 26 0 
38. DoSubjectSearch_VxA 10,549 60,854 40 39 1 0 100 0 100 0 10,132 377 0 40 
39. DoAuthorSearch_Vx0 10,541 60,790 49 50 1 0 100 0 100 0 10,118 378 45 0 
40. DoAuthorSearch_VxA 10,549 60,854 40 39 1 0 100 0 100 0 10,132 377 0 40 
41. GetCustomer_Vx0 10,551 61,187 22 21 1 0 100 0 100 0 10,092 437 22 0 
42. GetCustomer_VxA 10,753 62,295 36 35 1 0 100 0 100 0 10,277 440 0 36 
rest-auth-proxy 655 2838 354 378 4 332 6 343 9 4 22 301 0 0 
43. LdapAuthService 655 2838 354 378 4 332 6 343 9 4 22 301 0 0 
Total 571,730 3,850,237 23,714 27,836 154 5773 5759 39 486,825 74,776 3645 751 
Mean 13,296 89,540 551 647 4 133 76 134 79 1 11,322 1739 85 17 
Median 10,551 60,790 287 301 3 0 100 0 100 0 9923 651 21 0 
auditors have no access to program chopping tools, our approach 
can also indicate the percentage of the entire program code that 
has to be audited with security slices. 
6.3.2. Soundness 
To answer RQ2, we manually inspected all the security slices 
(39) returned by JoanAudit and compared them to their normal 
chop counterparts, to determine whether our security slicing ap- 
proach had pruned any information relevant to auditing XSS, SQLi, 
XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi vulnerabilities. 
To illustrate this manual inspection process, we use the sim- 
pliﬁed code excerpt below, which corresponds to a security slice 
extracted from the rest-auth-proxy / LdapAuthService program 
by JoanAudit . 
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In the code above, function authenticatePost() can be 
called by a user to request authentication with the rest-auth- 
proxy web service; its inputs are the username ( user , line 2) 
and the password ( pass , line 3). Function getLdap() cre- 
ates an LdapAuthentication object, which manages all the 
communications with the LDAP backend server and stores con- 
ﬁguration attributes that are important for user authentication 
(e.g., distinguished name, search ﬁlter, LDAP host address, port). 
First, the pre-conﬁgured search ﬁlter is loaded from the con- 
ﬁguration ﬁle (line 14); then, an LdapAuthentication ob- 
ject is created (line 15). The pre-conﬁgured search ﬁlter can 
contain placeholders surrounded by curly brackets that are re- 
placed with concrete values. For example, given the search 
ﬁlter (&(objectClass = inetOrgPerson)(uid = {user})) , 
the placeholder {user} is replaced with the value pro- 
vided with parameter user at line 18, and then the result 
is stored in the LdapAuthentication object through the 
setSearchFilter() method. 
We started our manual inspection process at the sink (line 18), 
to determine the variables it uses ( sfilter in the example 
above). Then, we tracked back its dependent statements to identify 
how the variables were processed. We determined that there was 
an unsanitized input at line 2 on which the sink in line 18 is data 
dependent. Hence, a user could alter the semantics of the search 
ﬁlter sfilter by injecting LDAP ﬁlter fragments such as () ∗ & 
| through the user variable at line 2. There was no known LDAPi 
vulnerability reported before for rest-auth-proxy ; by using our tool, 
we detected a new LDAPi vulnerability and reported it to the de- 
velopers. 
In addition to inspecting security slices, we also manually in- 
spected all the normal chops (154 chops) to determine if our se- 
curity slicing had incorrectly dropped the whole chop from being 
reported (i.e., generating a false negative). Following a similar pro- 
cess, we veriﬁed that our security slicing approach neither missed 
any information important for security auditing nor incorrectly 
dropped any chop: this answers RQ2. The chops and their security 
slice counterparts are available on the tool website ( Thomé, 2015 ). 
6.3.3. Performance 
To answer RQ3, we measured the time taken for performing 
each step in the generation of security slices and normal chops; 
the results are shown in Table 4 . JoanAudit took an average of 
27s to analyze individual test subjects and required a maximum 
of 124s to analyze the largest one. These results show that JoanAu- 
dit exhibits good run-time performance, which makes it suitable to 
analyze Java Web applications similar in size to our test subjects, 
which is the case for many such systems. 
Furthermore, we remark that the sum of the values in 
the columns “SDG Generation”, “Source/Sink Identiﬁcation”, and 
“Chopping” corresponds to the execution time of the state-of-the- 
art chopping implementation provided by Joana extended with 
source/sink identiﬁcation capabilities (i.e., normal chopping ). The 
difference between this approach and ours lies only in the extra 
time taken by the ﬁltering step, which on average accounts for 33% 
of the total time. 
6.4. Threats to validity 
Our empirical evaluation is subject to threats to validity. The 
results were obtained from 9 selected Web applications, and hence, 
they cannot necessarily be generalized to all Web applications. We 
minimized this threat by choosing test subjects that vary in sizes 
and functionalities, and by picking realistic Java projects, which in 
many cases represent well-known benchmarks in the context of 
security. 
We compared our approach, in terms of size reduction and per- 
formance, with a state-of-the-art chopping implementation pro- 
vided by Joana extended with source/sink identiﬁcation capabili- 
ties. Note that we expect, however, to achieve similar results when 
comparing with other Java program slicing/chopping tools (e.g., In- 
dus ( Jayaraman et al., 2005 )) since our approach works on top of 
program chopping and is independent from the speciﬁc chopping 
tool we use. 
Lastly, since our security slicing approach and tool are targeted 
towards Java Web applications, the approach may not produce 
the same results for Web applications written in other languages. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental principles of our approach are not 
language-speciﬁc and can be adapted to other languages using the 
corresponding program slicing tools (e.g., CodeSurfer ( Teitelbaum, 
20 0 0 ) for C ++ ). 
7. Related work 
Related work that deal with the security auditing of XSS, SQLi, 
XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi vulnerabilities can be broadly catego- 
rized into two areas: static taint analysis and program slicing ap- 
proaches. 
7.1. Static taint analysis 
Static taint analysis approaches label data from input sources 
as tainted data and then detect vulnerabilities if the tainted data 
ﬂows into sinks — which may be exploited by tainted data — with- 
out passing through any sanitization function (declassiﬁer). Imple- 
mentation of static taint analysis are available for Java Web sys- 
tems ( Almorsy et al., 2012; Livshits and Lam, 2005; Pérez et al., 
2011; Tripp et al., 2009; 2013; Huang et al., 2014 ), for PHP Web 
systems ( Jovanovic et al., 20 06; Xie and Aiken, 20 06; Wassermann 
and Su, 2008; Nunes et al., 2015; Medeiros et al., 2016 ), and for 
Android systems ( Arzt et al., 2014 ). 
In general, there are three key differences between static taint 
analysis approaches and our security slicing approach. First, static 
taint analysis approaches tend to focus on data-ﬂow based tainting 
only, and do not consider control-dependency information. This in- 
formation is often essential for correctly identifying vulnerabilities 
or auditing the correctness of input sanitization procedures, since 
selection statements are often used to check user inputs. For exam- 
ple, consider the code snippet below, corresponding to a sampled, 
simpliﬁed slice, extracted from WebGoat : 
In the above example, a taint analysis approach would falsely 
report a vulnerability. More speciﬁcally, it would detect a data- 
ﬂow from the input source at line 1 to the sink at line 3, with- 
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Table 4 
Execution time of the individual steps in JoanAudit (in ms). 
SDG Source/Sink Chopping Filtering Total 
Generation identiﬁcation 
WebGoat 21,774 201 59,427 42,278 123,680 
Roller 5079 64 16,125 1241 22,509 
Pebble 2949 21 234 40 3244 
Regain 4315 20 758 354 5447 
PubSub 2876 41 367 224 3508 
TPC-App 16,297 112 2157 4349 22,915 
TPC-C 8089 63 3931 6664 18,747 
TPC-W 7590 31 313 3044 10,978 
rest-auth-proxy 945 6 6220 25,765 32,936 
Mean 7768 62 9948 9329 27,107 
out considering that the sanitization achieved through the call to 
parseInt() at line 2 would have an impact on the value of 
employeeId itself. By contrast, our approach correctly identiﬁes 
the path from line 1 to line 3 as secure due to the presence of the 
parseInt() declassiﬁer; hence, it does not report a vulnerability. 
In general, lack of support for control-ﬂow dependencies can be 
the source of many false positive results: Jovanovic et al. ’s taint 
analysis tool ( Jovanovic et al., 2006 ) reported ﬁve false positives; 
Tripp et al. (2013) reported 40% false positives on analyzing We- 
bGoat ; Shar and Tan (2012) also reported that Livshits and Lam’s 
taint analysis approach ( Livshits and Lam, 2005 ) yielded 20% false 
positives due to missing control-dependency information. Although 
there are some taint analysis approaches ( Clause et al., 2007; King 
et al., 2008; Schwartz et al., 2010; Kang et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 
2015 that analyze control-dependency information, but they sup- 
port programming languages different from Java and/or do not ad- 
dress injection vulnerabilities (with the exception of Clause et al. 
(2007) , which addresses SQLi in the context of dynamic taint anal- 
ysis for ×86 code). 
Second, declassiﬁcation is the only form of ﬁltering provided by 
taint analysis approaches (e.g., as in Nunes et al., 2015 ) whereas 
our approach additionally ﬁlters irrelevant and known-good library 
functions and also ﬁxes some of the vulnerabilities automatically. 
Last, our approach speciﬁcally targets XSS, SQLi, XMLi, XPathi, 
and LDAPi vulnerabilities. Current taint analysis-based approaches 
address only SQLi and/or XSS. To the best of our knowledge, only 
Pérez et al. (2011) readily address XMLi, XPathi, and LDAPi for Java 
Web systems. However, since Pérez et al. ’s work is not evaluated, 
it is diﬃcult to verify its effectiveness. Medeiros et al. (2016) read- 
ily address XPathi and LDAPi but for PHP Web systems. It is pos- 
sible to adapt existing approaches to support XMLi, XPathi, and 
LDAPi and even equip them with our proposed ﬁltering mecha- 
nisms. However, since developers are often not security experts, 
these tasks may not be trivial. By contrast, our tool is already con- 
ﬁgured with an extensive library of input sources, sinks, and de- 
classiﬁers speciﬁc to these vulnerabilities and thus, it can be used 
out-of-the-box. 
7.2. Program slicing 
Krinke (2004) proposes barrier slicing approaches that could al- 
low auditors to ﬁlter speciﬁc parts of the program that are known 
to be correct. Our approach makes use of this idea to prune Java 
libraries that are irrelevant to our security auditing purposes. 
Despite the various slicing approaches proposed in the litera- 
ture, in practice there are only two slicers that can handle all Java 
features: Indus ( Jayaraman et al., 2005 ) and Joana ( Hammer, 2009 ). 
Indus is built on top of Soot ( Vallée-Rai et al.,1999 ), a Java bytecode 
analysis framework, and is less precise than Joana , since it does not 
fully support interprocedural slicing ( Hammer, 2009 ). As discussed 
in Section 3 , Joana provides a sound and precise approach for com- 
puting slices and chops. As our approach and tool are built on top 
of Joana , we have the same advantages. However, Joana only gen- 
erates slices for generic tasks like checking information ﬂow and 
debugging. By contrast, we provide additional techniques for prun- 
ing statements in the slices produced by Joana and target security 
auditing of vulnerabilities. Therefore, Joana represents our baseline 
for comparison. 
Shar and Tan (2012) propose a program slicing-based approach 
for auditing the implemented defense features to prevent XSS. 
The approach of Yamaguchi et al. (2013) and Yamaguchi et al. 
(2014) extracts abstract syntax trees and program dependence 
graphs relevant to auditing buffer overﬂow vulnerabilities in C/C++ 
code. The key difference between these approaches and ours is 
that they do not focus on minimizing the size of the extracted 
code, because their main objective is to extract all the possible 
defense features. By contrast, we extract all the features relevant 
for security auditing and yet, we also minimize the size of the ex- 
tracted code by ﬁltering irrelevant or secure code, making security 
auditing scalable and practical. 
Backes et al. (2014) present a program slicing-based approach 
for auditing privacy data leakage issues in Android code. Similarly 
to our approach, they also reduce SDG size by ﬁltering known- 
good and irrelevant library code. But unlike our approach, they do 
not consider declassiﬁcation and automated ﬁxing. Further, as our 
objectives are different, the speciﬁcations of sources, sinks, and li- 
brary APIs are also different. Hassanshahi et al. (2015) propose an 
approach for detecting Web-to-App Injection (W2AI) attacks, an at- 
tack type where an adversary can exploit a vulnerable app through 
the bridge that enables interaction between the browser and apps 
installed on Android phones. Like our approach, they also make 
use of program slicing based on the ICFG in conjunction with a 
pre-deﬁned set of sources and sinks. However, the main objective 
of their work is the detection of 0-day W2AI vulnerabilities rather 
than helping security analysts to audit source code for ﬁnding and 
ﬁxing vulnerabilites of various kind. 
8. Conclusion and future work 
Injection vulnerabilities are among the most common and seri- 
ous security threats to Web applications. A number of approaches 
have been developed to help identify many of those vulnerabilities 
in source code, such as taint analysis. However, they still generate 
too many false alarms to be practical, or miss some vulnerabili- 
ties. Therefore, they cannot effectively support security auditing by 
identifying and ﬁxing vulnerabilities in source code in a scalable 
manner. 
In this paper, we have presented an approach based on state- 
of-the-art program slicing, to assist the security auditing of com- 
mon injection vulnerabilities, namely XSS, SQLi, XMLi, XPathi, and 
LDAPi. For every security-sensitive operation in the program, the 
approach extracts a sound and precise slice, along with path con- 
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ditions, to help analysts perform security auditing on minimal 
chunks of source code. This is meant to complement current vul- 
nerability detection approaches, by helping the auditor identify 
false positives and negatives. We implemented our approach in the 
JoanAudit tool, which we evaluated on 43 Web applications, gener- 
ating 39 security slices. In comparison with conventional program 
slices, we observed that our security slices are 76% smaller on av- 
erage, while still retaining all the information relevant for verifying 
common vulnerabilities. The tool and the test subjects used for the 
evaluation are available online ( Thomé, 2015 ). 
As part of future work, we plan to enhance our approach by au- 
tomating the veriﬁcation of vulnerabilities. In particular, we aim to 
develop techniques that can make symbolic execution scale up, so 
that it can be applied for the feasibility analysis of the conjunction 
of path conditions with security threat conditions. 
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